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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN-LOADS CRITERIA, METHODS, 
AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR PRELAUNCH, 
LIFT-OFF, AND MIDBOOST CONDITIONS 
By Alden C. Mackey and Robert D. Schwartz 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
The development of the Apollo spacecraft design loads and operational procedures 
for prelaunch, lift-off, and midboost conditions is outlined in  this report. The design 
.criteria, mathematical models, loads analyses, changes in vehicle and environmental 
data, and wind-monitoring procedures are discussed for  each condition. 
The original cr i ter ia  and analyses deficiencies and the important improvements 
achieved during the design evolution are noted. Recommendations are made for future 
programs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Space vehicle structural-design conditions in  which wind is a factor warrant exam- 
ination separate from other design conditions. The wind conditions considered for the 
Apollo spacecraft design included the prelaunch, lift-off, and boost phases for both the 
Apollo/Saturn IB and Apollo/Saturn V mission configurations. 
With the exception of the lunar module (LM), the Apollo spacecraft, consisting of . 
the command and service module and spacecraft/lunar module adapter (SLA), was  de- 
veloped in  two major phases. The Block I phase included both boilerplate and airframe 
vehicles used in  ground and flight tests.  Information from these tests was  used in  the 
design and development of the Block I spacecraft and subsequently in  the design of the 
Block I1 spacecraft. 
- 
On the launch pad, the Apollo/Saturn IB is protected from wind by the support 
structure, which encloses the spacecraft vehicle and is used for assembly and service 
until the service structure is rolled back before launch. The concern about wind loads 
on the Apollo/Saturn V vehicle begins when the space vehicle emerges from the Vertical 
Assembly Building (VAB). The space vehicle is exposed to ground winds from the time 
it is transported by the crawler to Launch Complex 39 until the time of launch. An 
auxiliary damper is attached to the vehicle f rom the launch umbilical tower (LUT) to 
reduce dynamic responses of the vehicle during its exposure to the ground winds. The 
damper is removed approximately 4 hours before launch. During the prelaunch condi- 
tions, winds a r e  the only force that can cause significant responses in  the vehicle. 
Before lift-off, the vehicle is responding to winds plus unsymmetrical thrust 
buildup and thrust misalinement forces. These forces cause static and dynamic vehicle 
deflections and result  in  large constraining loads in  the holddown structure.  At lift-off, 
the sudden release of these constraining loads induces lateral  and longitudinal structural  
oscillations and dynamic loads in  the space vehicle. 
The winds aloft contribute significantly to the vehicle loading only during f i rs t -  
stage boost. The major wind loading occurs during the period of high dynamic pressure;  
therefore, even though high winds may occur later during boost, they do not affect ve- 
hicle loading significantly. 
The purpose of this  report  is to document the development of the Apollo spacecraft 
design-loads cri teria,  methods, and operational procedures for  the conditions in  which 
wind is a factor. The discussion includes the design cr i ter ia  and methods shortcomings, 
their impact on spacecraft design and operations, and recommendations for  future 
programs. 
During prelaunch, launch, and boost, the Apollo spacecraft loads are directly re-  
lated to the loading environment of the entire space vehicle. Therefore, the sources of 
loading on both the launch vehicle and the spacecraft are emphasized in  this report .  
However, i t  is the Apollo Program impact of the spacecraft loads, not the launch vehi- 
cle loads, that forms the basis for the conclusions and recommendations presented 
herein. 
PRELAUNCH 
The prelaunch phase is the period from the final joining of the Apollo spacecraft 
with the launch vehicle to the ignition of the first-stage main engines. Concern for  de- 
sign wind loads begins when the Saturn V vehicle leaves the VAB or when the Saturn 1B 
service structure is removed. 
The original design cr i ter ia  included the requirement that the freestanding 
(laterally unrestrained) launch vehicle, with unpressurized tanks, must withstand 
99.9-percentile winds of the most severe wind month. The 99.9-percentile winds are 
. those that would be exceeded only 0.1 percent of the time during the worst wind month. 
For the 99.9-percentile steady-state wind profile (table I and ref. l), the wind veloc- 
ities are referenced to height above the mean ground level. 
The definition of the wind environment used for vehicle design did not include sev- 
e ra l  important effects critical to vehicle loading. These effects were wind-exposure 
periods, variation in gust factors,  variation in  wind profiles, wind directionality, and 
wind turbulence. 
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TABLE I. - SURFACE-WINDSPEED ENVELOPE 99.9 PERCENTILE 
FOR EASTERN TEST  RANGE^ 
Height above 
natural grade 
m 
3.0 
9.1 
18.3 
30.5 
61.0 
91.4 
121.9 
152.4 
ft 
10 
30 
60 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
Quasi-steady-state 
windspeed 
m/sec 
11.8 
14.8 
16.9 
18.8 
21.6 
23.4 
24.7 
25.9 
knots 
23.0 
28.7 
32.9 
36.5 
41.9 
45.4 
48.1 
50.3 
b Peak windspeed 
m/sec 
16.6 
20.7 
23.7 
26.3 
30.2 
32.7 
34.6 
36.2 
%ind velocity distribution with height is 
where V = wind velocity at  desired height 
= wind velocity at reference height 'Ref 
h = altitude at which wind velocity is desired 
= reference altitude hRef 
bPeak wind velocity is 1.4 times steady-state wind velocity 
knots 
32.2 
40.2 * 
46.1 
51.1 
58.7 
63.6 
67.3 
70.4 
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The 99.9-percentile steady-state wind profile used in  the original design was 
based on the assumption that the space vehicle would be exposed to the ground-wind en- 
vironment for  only a few hours; that is, the vehicle would be transported from the VAB 
to the launch pad and launched within a few hours. However, most Apollo/Saturn vehi- 
cles were exposed to the launch pad environment for several  months. A realistic ex- 
posure period would have resulted in  higher magnitudes for the 99.9-percentile winds; 
hence, the original cr i ter ia  were not adequate. The exposure-period definition was the 
most important deficiency in  the ground-wind environment, but the other listed defi- 
ciencies also were significant. 
To evaluate the complex effects that contribute to the definition of the winds in  the 
boundary layer of the atmosphere, a 150-meter meteorological tower facility was con- 
structed in the Merritt Island Launch Area at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) in  Florida. A complete description of the tower is given in reference 2. Data 
obtai’ned from this meteorological facility a r e  useful for the study of the characterist ics 
of the lower atmosphere wind and temperature profiles as a function of height and time, 
gust-shape phenomena, turbulence spectra,  correlation properties of steady-state and 
turbulent flow, and calculations of diffusion parameters that define the environment to 
which the space vehicles would be exposed during the prelaunch period. 
Although the environment definition used in  ground-wind design cr i ter ia  w a s  orig- 
inally deficient in  several a reas ,  it was later improved. A complete description of the 
present definition is given in  reference 3. 
As wind flows by a cylinder, the wake behind the cylinder is disturbed and is char- 
acterized by distinct vortexes, as shown in figure 1. Clockwise and counterclockwise 
vortexes a re  shed in an alternate regular manner. The Von Karman vortex shedding 
causes a harm-n~ica!!;~ ~ a r y i n g  fsrce oii the cyiirider normai to tne wind direction 
(ref .  4). Originally, vortex-shedding load for design loads was assumed to be 
1.25 times the drag load resulting from steady-state winds. In 1963, a wind-tunnel 
test  program was initiated to define the dynamic response of the Apollo/Saturn vehicles, 
particularly the vortex-shedding response. Two separate series of tes t s  were run on 
the freestanding Apollo/Saturn IB and Saturn V vehicles. Vehicle response to vortex 
shedding w a s  identified as a potential problem, and further tes ts  were planned. 
Ft 
L 
FD = Drag force 
F = L i f t  force L 
Figure 1. - Vortexes shedding in 
a wake. 
In the fall of 1964, a third series of 
wind-tunnel tes ts  was initiated on the Apollo/ 
Saturn V configuration. The tes t  model in- 
cluded the space vehicle and the LUT but not 
the mobile service structure.  Testing was  
completed on empty, intermediate, and fully 
fueled vehicles. During the tes ts ,  the 
vortex-shedding response w a s  identified as 
a crit ical  launch vehicle loading condition 
for empty and intermediate propellant 
weights. The change in  vehicle propellant 
weights a l ters  the elastic vibrational char- 
acter is t ics  of the vehicle, which in  turn 
affect the vehicle vortex-shedding response. 
Several potential fixes, such as helical 
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strakes,  were evaluated on the test model. These tested fixes, which would have al- 
tered the aerodynamic configuration, were rejected, and an auxiliary damper was rec- 
ommended. A fourth ser ies  of wind-tunnel tests was completed i n  June 1966. The test  
model was modified to include the effects of the mobile service structure,  and testing 
was performed for the empty and intermediate propellant conditions. The resul ts  from 
these tes ts  were used to develop a viscous damping system that was installed on subse- 
quent Apollo/Saturn V operational vehicles. This damping system was attached between 
the LUT and the command module (CM) launch escape system tower (fig. 2). 
As a result of the wind-tunnel tes ts ,  the original 1.25 vortex-shedding factor for  
design was changed. For vehicle ground operations with the damping system attached 
and unattached, the vortex-shedding load w a s  assumed to be, respectively, 1.6 and 
3.6 t imes the drag load resulting from steady-state winds. 
The final wind-tunnel test on the Apollo/Saturn V configurations w a s  completed 
during June 1967. The purpose of the test  was to evaluate ground-wind boundary layer 
effects on the dynamic response of the vehicle. The test  indicated that ground-wind 
boundary layer effects could be ignored in  the prediction of dynamic response for  the 
ground-wind loads condition. Primarily,  this insensitivity to boundary layer effects is 
caused by the small  variation along the vehicle of the design wind magnitude. 
Figure 2.- Viscous damper for 
Apollo/Saturn V. 
The third and final se r ies  of wind- 
tunnel tes ts  on the Apollo/Saturn IB vehicle 
was completed during the spring of 1965. 
In this testing, numerous wind azimuths 
were investigated for full and empty propel- 
lant conditions and for empty conditions (the 
more severe weight condition). No critical 
condition was identified during the Apollo/ 
Saturn IB test; hence, no further testing 
was required. 
The high dynamic responses measured 
i n  the Apollo/Saturn V wind-tunnel tests 
caused concern about the ability of the vehi- 
cle to withstand the on-pad environment. In 
an  effort to verify the results f rom the wind- 
tunnel tes ts ,  ground-wind tests were initi- 
ated using a full-scale Apollo/Saturn V 
facilities verification vehicle. The objec- ’ 
tives of the tes ts  were to evaluate the re -  
sponse of the Apollo/Saturn V during 
transportation from the VAB to Launch 
Complex 39 and to measure vehicle response 
during exposure to launch pad environment 
fo r  long time periods. The pad 39 tes ts  
started on May 25, 1966, and were com- 
pleted on October 14, 1966. During the 
testing period, the vehicle w a s  returned to 
the VAB (June 8 to 10, 1966) for protection 
from a hurricane that passed through the 
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area.  Data from the tes ts  were inconclusive in  defining the vehicle response to ground 
winds. High-magnitude winds were experienced only during the time of the hurricane, 
but no loads o r  accelerations were recorded during that period because of an instrumen- 
tation systems failure. Also, to preclude the possibility of a structural  failure, a 
damper was attached from the LUT to station 2560 in  the S-II/S-IVB interstage. With 
the addition of this damper, overall structural  damping for the vehicle was calculated 
to be 5.5 percent compared with the assumed 1 percent for the vehicle structure with- 
out auxiliary damping. Dynamic response of the vehicle was restricted severely by 
damping of this magnitude, and the Von Karman vortex-shedding effect was never de- 
tected during the course of the test. 
. Data f rom wind-tunnel and full-scale tests did result  in  the viscous damping sys- 
tem being installed to reduce vehicle dynamic loads, but the data were available too 
late for  inclusion in  space vehicle design. The installation of the viscous damping sys- 
tem eliminated the high dynamic responses to winds and resulted in  prelaunch loads be- 
low the structural capability of the space vehicle. Two significant lessons that apply 
to ground-wind environment and loads definition were learned from the Apollo/Saturn 
program. First, an accurate definition of the vehicle exposure to the launch pad en- 
vironment is required. Second, wind-tunnel testing for ground winds should be timely 
so that the results can be considered in  the vehicle design. 
LAUNCH 
The launch period is the time from the initiation of first-stage start sequence un- 
til all structural response transients following vehicle release have damped out. The 
structural  response and accompanyir.g inertia! loads zre caused primariiy by a lift-off 
phenomenon often called "twang. '' Twang is the vehicle dynamic response to the sudden 
release at the holddown a r m s  of the constraining shear ,  moment, and axial forces.  
These holddown forces  are caused by the ground winds and thrust buildup before release. 
Therefore, the calculation of design lift-off loads is dependent on an accurate definition 
of the wind- and propulsion-induced loading environments and an accurate mathematical 
model describing the structural  response. The advent of the large, flexible Apollo/ 
Saturn IB and Saturn V vehicles was a unique opportunity to advance the state of the a r t  
in calculating lift-off loads; however, in  the calculation process,  several  deficiencies 
in  design philosophy became evident. 
Wind- I nduced Loadi ng 
The original launch wind cr i ter ia  specified that the Apollo spacecraft should be 
? designed for the launch of a Saturn IB o r  Saturn V exposed to the 95-percent-probability- 
level winds (table 11). The peak wind velocities, gust profile, and vortex-shedding ef- 
fects were established in  a manner similar to  those described in  the prelaunch section. 
Lateral drag forces caused by the design wind profile were applied omnidirectionally to 
the vehicle throughout the design and design verification phases of the Apollo Program. 
The loading caused by Von Karman vortex shedding w a s  considered in  the original 
criterion to be 1.25 times the steady-state wind loading acting perpendicular to the wind. 
During the design verification phase, wind-tunnel test data were used to determine the 
6 
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TABLE II. - SURFACE-WINDSPEED ENVELOPE 95 PERCENTILE 
FOR EASTERN TEST  RANGE^ 
Height above natural 
grade, ft 
10 
30 
60  
100 
200 
3 00 
400 
5 00 
Steady-state windspeed, 
ft/sec 
23 .6  
29 .4  
33 .8  
37 .5  
4 3 . 1  
46 .6  
49 .5  
5 1 . 7  
b Peak windspeed, 
ft/sec 
%ind velocity distribution with height is 
where V = wind velocity at desired height 
VRef = wind velocity at reference height 
h = altitude at which wind velocity is desired 
= reference altitude hRef 
bPeak wind velocity is 1 .4  t imes steady-state wind velocity. 
3 3 . 1  
41 .2  
47 .3  
52 .5  
60 .3  
6 5 . 2  
69 .2  
71 .8  
* 
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Apollo/Saturn IB and Saturn V vortex-shedding characteristics and to provide better 
predictions than the approximations in the original cri teria.  The improved vortex- 
shedding predictions were included in  the calculation of design verification loads. 
Three major deficiencies in  the Apollo wind cr i ter ia  development became evident. 
First, although the design wind profiles were based on numerous windspeed time his- 
tories,  exposure time statistics were not considered throughout the design and design 
verification phases. Had a 1-hour period of exposure to the winds been considered, the 
95-percentile design peak wind envelope would have been approximately 20 percent 
higher than that of table 11. Second, although the vortex-shedding approximations were 
significant in magnitude but were known to be crude approximations, a wind-tunnel pro- 
gram'to provide a better definition of the unsteady effects commenced too late fo r  sup- 
port of the design phase. Finally, wind direction, which is particularly important in  
definjing the vortex-shedding factor, was not considered. For example, although the 
wind-tunnel data indicated a much larger vortex-shedding factor than the 1.25 design 
factor, the unsteady effect exists for only a narrow range of wind directions because 
the LUT interferes with the wind. It is apparent that exposure time, vortex shedding, 
and wind direction have varying effects on the vehicle loads at  lift-off that were not con- 
sidered in  the design. As a result ,  the probability of actually experiencing design wind 
conditions at  lift-off was unknown. The combined effects of wind direction, exposure 
time, and vortex shedding were not investigated until a NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space 
Center (JSC), formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Monte Carlo statistical 
lift-off loads analysis w a s  conducted late in the design verification phase. 
Because of the shortcomings in  design cr i ter ia  and data, the need to develop meth- 
ods to restrict  the vehicle operations in  a severe wind environment was  evident. There- 
fore,  an effective wind-monitoring procedure was sought so that the Apollo/Sa!xrn IB 
and Szb.~r:: V vehicles couici be operated efficiently and safely during lift-off. The orig- 
inal  system used anemometers 60 feet above ground level to establish wind measure- 
ment limits. Wind distribution and vehicle dynamic effects could not be detected from 
these wind measurements. Therefore, design-level vortex shedding and gust dynamics 
were, conservatively, always assumed to be present. Because measurable vehicle dy- 
namics caused by vortex shedding had never been detected on the Apollo/Saturn IB or 
Saturn V vehicles, this launch wind procedure resulted in  an undesirably severe re- 
striction. Several vehicle-response-monitoring systems that include the use  of sensi- 
tive guidance and control velocity change measurements, ground-based optical 
measurements, and vehicle linear accelerometers were investigated. Not one of these 
systems was found to be practical. The procedure finally was improved when Saturn IB 
load measurements at the S-IB/S-IVB interface and Saturn V load measurements at the 
OS-IC intertank region were calibrated to read out bending moment while the vehicle was 
still on the pad. The measurements and calibrations were checked by a vehicle canti- 
levered calibration test .  Although load measurements at  the holddown structure would 
have indicated more accurately the entire loading on the vehicle, the interface measure- 
ments provided satisfactory information indicating the presence of vehicle dynamics 
caused by gusts and vortex shedding. As a result ,  the load measurement became the 
backup to the wind measurement in the wind-monitoring system for Apollo 7 and 8 and 
became the primary mode, with wind measurement serving as a backup, for the Apollo 9 
and subsequent vehicles. The new procedure provided greater ,  more realistic opera- 
tional capability; consequently, load measurement has been recommended as the pri-  
mary wind-monitoring procedure for  future programs. 
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A subsequent wind-monitoring innovation was a change in  the operational reference 
height from the 60-foot anemometers to a 530-foot anemometer atop the LUT. This 
change was made to obtain measurements more representative of the winds influencing 
the vehicle. The new reference height for  wind monitoring was first used operationally 
for  the Apollo 14 mission. 
Propul sion-l nduced Loadi ng 
The importance of thrust buildup dynamics to the vehicle design for launch release 
was recognized early in  the Apollo Program. Unfortunately, although the cr i ter ia  Spec- 
ified that thrust buildup was to be considered i n  the calculation of lift-off loads, no 
measured data were available for thrust misalinement o r  unsymmetrical thrust buildup 
in  the initial Block I analysis. However, thrust misalinement effects were established 
before the first calculation of Block I1 loads. A statistical analysis indicated that lateral 
loads caused by booster engine misalinement would approximate 5 percent of the ground- 
wind loads; therefore, for  convenience, the ground-wind loads were increased by 5 per- 
cent to account for this effect. The portion of unsymmetrical thrust buildup base 
moment caused by off-nominal engine ignition times w a s  not considered in  the lateral  
loads until the design verification phase. 
Although off-nominal effects were not included, the effects of the planned stag- 
gered engine ignition sequence were included in the thrust buildup cr i ter ia  for axial 
loads calculations. The original Saturn IB engine start sequence was planned so that 
pa i r s  of diametrically opposed engines would fire simultaneously with a stagger time of 
0 .1  second between pairs.  The Saturn V engine start sequence w a s  defined so that the 
center engine would ignite first, followed by opposing pa i rs  of engines with a 
0.25-second stagger time between the center engine and each of the pairs.  
Data provided by propulsion tes ts  led to  design verification thrust buildup cr i ter ia  
considerably different f rom those of the design phase. A new Saturn V F-1 engine start 
time sequence was  established with a 0.3-second stagger time between engine pa i rs  in- 
stead of the 0.25-second stagger time used i n  the design phase. The cr i ter ia  defined 
the F-1 engine start time as the time required for the thrust to reach 90 000 pounds. 
The 30 dispersion on start time of one F-1 engine was ? 0.233 second. The Saturn IB 
start sequence w a s  unchanged in  the design verification phase. After propulsion tes ts  
were evaluated, revised Saturn V and Saturn IB thrust buildup envelopes and the dis- 
persions defining the unsymmetrical thrust buildup characterist ics were established 
and included in  the Apollo design verification. In addition, stage alinement tes t s  pro- 
vided data to establish a Saturn V 3a dispersion i n  thrust vector alinement, which was 
used to calculate design verification loads. 
. 
Several additional effects of propulsion-induced loading not included in the design 
phase were noted and evaluated during the Apollo Program. For  example, a Saturn V 
failure that would permit the F-1 engines to start  out of their normal sequence was 
possible. This type of failure could add significantly to the unsymmetrical thrust forces 
at the vehicle base. An analysis indicated that the Saturn V start-sequence failure could 
increase the spacecraft lateral structural loads by approximately 4 percent. Another 
propulsion effect not considered in  the original lift-off design was that of control- 
system-directed engine gimbaling. The Saturn V control system is active from ignition 
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through release and, in  fact, is used to direct the vehicle in  a tower-avoidance maneu- 
ver  shortly after release.  The effects of gimbaling did not add significantly to struc- 
tural  lift-off loads but should have been considered i n  the design. 
Mathematical Modeling 
The original structural  mathematical models for lift-off were based on lateral 
beam models and axial spring mass models of both the Saturn IB and Saturn V from 
which uncoupled bending and axial modes were computed. The preliminary Block I 
spacecraft model included an LM that was assumed to be rigidly attached to the SLA. 
A sep'arate model used for Block I loads included the LM axially connected to the SLA 
by a spring but laterally rigid. This spacecraft-loads model formed the basis fo r  the 
preli$inary Block I1 loads. Later in  the design phase, the models were modified to 
include an LM represented by a mass axially and laterally connected to the SLA by 
springs. However, the lift-off condition required more complex dynamic models than 
the Saturn IB and Saturn V beam models used for  design. Accurate loads were not cal- 
culated until three-dimensional models were developed late in the design verification 
phase. The two-dimensional mathematical models were not sufficient, for example, 
to predict accurately the relative torsional motion of the CM with respect to the service 
module (SM). As a result, the torsion loads used for early design were based on rigid- 
body roll  accelerations. Later,  dynamic tes ts  of the Apollo/Saturn V were made using 
the dynamic test  vehicle at the NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). 
These tests indicated considerable axial-torsional coupling at the CM/SM interface, so  
more accurate torsion loads were calculated. 
Although two-dimensional lateral  and axial I_oad,c were zompiiied ana documented 
of the Apollo/Saturn V was developed la ter ,  and loads were updated. The Apollo 9 and 
subsequent mission compatibility loads were calculated with the three-dimensional 
models. 
qn :..thq b A ~ ~  wzaigii cl------ verification phase, a 180-degree-of-freedom, three-dimensional model 
In addition to the problems created by cr i ter ia  omissions and uncoupled models, 
the mathematical models used to calculate the design loads did not describe realistically 
the actual lift-off condition. Design wind profiles were applied without regard to direc- 
tion or exposure-time statistics. Wind- and propulsion-induced forcing functions were 
derived by root sum squaring worst-case inputs. Axial loads were calculated using 
forcing functions different from lateral loads. The lateral loads were calculated in  the 
pitch and yaw planes, and the maximum loads were root sum squared. Therefore,  al- 
*though a 95-percentile wind profile was used in  the design, the method of root sum 
'squaring inputs and outputs resulted in  design loads that had no valid statistical basis. 
The probability of exceedance w a s  not known until late in  the design verification phase 
when the Monte Carlo lift-off loads analysis discussed earlier was completed (ref. 5). 
A Monte Carlo solution is one in which the input data fo r  many cases  a r e  selected 
at random from probability distributions. Outputs then a r e  analyzed statistically by 
constructing probability distributions from the resul ts  of all the cases.  The analysis 
was performed primarily to establish the feasibility of a Monte Carlo approach to lift- 
off loads. However, the analysis also indicated the conservative nature of the original 
and final Apollo design methods. A single, important load, the maximum bending mo- 
ment at  the CM/SM interface, was chosen as an example fo r  the Monte Carlo analysis. 
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A moment obtained by the Apollo design method of root sum squaring the maximum mo- 
ments from three cases  was compared with the Monte Carlo result .  Each of the three 
cases  was constructed from the selection of 30 wind, unsymmetrical thrust, and thrust 
misalinement forcing functions. Probability distributions of these data were prepared, 
and 200 independent se t s  of forcing functions were selected for  the Monte Carlo analy- 
sis. A compilation of the maximum CM/SM interface moment from all cases  estab- 
lished a log-normal distribution. The CM/SM bending moment obtained by the 
root-sum-square method (the design moment) was never exceeded in the 200 Monte 
Carlo cases and would not be expected to be exceeded at least 99.99 percent of the time. 
This example indicates the potentially conservative nature of a lift-off design load ob- 
tained by the root sum square of several  discrete cases  derived from worst-case in- 
put forcing functions. 
Another load source overlooked in the initial Apollo design phase was that result- 
ing from a conditioning and inerting purge of the SM and SLA. The purge increases  the 
SM and SLA internal pressure and, therefore, increases the CM/SM interface tension 
loads at lift-off. The purge pressure was  reflected in  the structural  capability analysis. 
INFLIGHT WIND RESPONSE 
The inflight wind response period extends from the time the lift-off transients 
damp out until the end of first-stage boost. The original design cr i ter ia  specified that 
the vehicle must withstand the winds associated with the 95-percentile idealized scalar 
windspeed profile envelope, windspeed changes (wind shear) for altitude differentials to 
10 000 feet (the 99-percentile windspeed changes), and a discrete quasi-square-wave 
gust (29.5 ft/sec) superimposed on the windspeed change so that the maximum wind- 
speed did not exceed the idealized windspeed profile. A wind profile constructed to 
these cr i ter ia  is shown in  figure 3.  These wind cr i ter ia  were to be applied to the vehi- 
cle from any horizontal direction during boost. 
Vehicle loads for this wind condition were determined using constant aerodynamic 
and inertial coefficients and included the effects of two elastic modes. An evaluation 
was made of the interpretation of the inflight wind-condition cr i ter ia ,  and an agreement 
was reached that the applied gust should be in  excess of the 95-percentile windspeed 
envelope. When this change was implemented and its severity evaluated, a statistical 
combination of the wind shear and wind gust was applied. The effect of this statistical 
combination was approximated by a 15-percent reduction of the wind shears  and wind- 
gust magnitude. The result  of this change also is indicated in  figure 3. 
Inflight wind-loads cr i ter ia  and analysis did not include the effects of turbulence, 
propellant slosh, wind direction, thrust oscillations, loads-minimization methods 
through trajectory shaping, gust penetration, higher frequency modes, and time-varying 
coefficients. Several of these effects significantly influence loads analysis. The most 
important effects not included in the design are  wind directionality and biasing of the 
command-pitch program in  operational trajectories to reduce space vehicle loads. 
Only the first Apollo mission did not involve the use of wind biasing for  load relief. 
For  the first mission, the pitch program was biased to induce loads into the space ve- 
hicle and to tes t  the vehicle structure. Subsequent to this mission, the decision w a s  
made to take advantage of the biasing technique and to attempt to reduce the inflight 
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wind loads during boost. The wind bias is based on the statistical mean wind for the 
quarter of the year when the vehicle is launched. Loads relief from the programed bias 
is verified with prelaunch wind measurements. Wind directionality w a s  not considered 
in  vehicle design until design verificatio:: was CGiiipleieci in  June 1988. In these analy- 
ses, the space vehicle loads were calculated using biased trajectories. The inflight 
winds were applied from the direction that would yield the most severe spacecraft load- 
ing. The direction and magnitude of the winds were based on the wind data found in 
reference 6. 
The primary wind-measuring system used at the time of the spacecraft design 
was a rawinsonde system. This system provided measurements of horizontal windspeed 
and direction a s  a function of altitude averaged over approximately 600 meters .  Be- 
cause the smoothing inherent in this system cannot provide measurements of small- 
scale wind motion, the original spacecraft design did not include the effects of 
atmospheric turbulence. 
A more accurate system for measuring inflight wind was required to provide de- 
tailed wind profiles and information for  statistical analyses to be used in  space vehicle 
development. The FPS- 16 radar/jimsphere system was developed as the wind- 
measuring device. The jimsphere sensor (balloon), when tracked by the FPS-16 radar ,  
provides a wind profile measurement f rom the surface to 17 kilometers altitude in ap- 
proximately 1 hour. The frequency resolution is fine enough to excite elastic-body re- 
sponses as much as 4 hertz in  an analysis of the high dynamic pressure phase of boost. 
A wind-monitoring team and system were established by JSC and MSFC to cal- 
culate inflight loads o r  responses on the space vehicle on which launch recommendations 
would be made. Launch restrictions for  the first two Apollo/Saturn missions were 
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based on angle-of-attack dynamic-pressure a q  limits that were proportional to the 
vehicle design loads. The a q  for  these missions w a s  predicted using measured rawin- 
sonde data from the launch site. The predicted aq history was compared with the a q  
allowable, and a recommendation was made to launch based on this comparison. This 
method of monitoring inflight winds did not include the effects of elastic-body response; 
variations in  axial load; nonlinear aerodynamics; propellant slosh; and variation in q 
caused by winds, turbulence, thrust oscillations, and gust penetration. 
Beginning with the AS-201 mission, a new method was  used to calculate spacecraft 
interface loads for comparison with structural allowables (fig. 4). The launch recom- 
mendation could be made on the basis of this comparison. The FPS-16/jimsphere data 
from this measurement system were put into a vehicle flight-simulation program for 
load calculation. In this operational procedure, the wind measurements and flight-loads 
simulations were begun 24 hours before launch and repeated periodically until launch. 
This procedure gave a history of the winds and vehicle loads that provided the basis of 
operational assurance during the actual launch. The flight-loads simulations for  both 
spacecraft and launch vehicle on the Apollo 4 to 10 missions were conducted by a joint 
JSC/MSFC monitoring team at  MSFC. These simulations included the effects missing 
in the a q  restrictions, with the exception of propellant slosh. The elastic-body defini- 
tion was restricted to two modes. 
Because the FPS- 16/jimsphere data measured before launch were transmitted 
from the launch complex at KSC to JSC and MSFC, a JSC flight-loads simulation that 
gave better definition of spacecraft loads was initiated for loads calculation to make the 
launch recommendation. A JSC flight simulation for inflight wind monitoring was  im- 
plemented on the Apollo 11 mission and has been used on all subsequent missions. This 
simulation includes the effects of four elastic-body bending modes and all the effects 
missing in  the a q  restrictions except for fuel slosh. 
Using the wind-biasing technique, inflight wind loads for the Apollo missions have 
been well below design values for all but the first mission, which was biased deliber- 
ately to increase the vehicle loads for a structural test. When the relieving pitch-plane 
bias is considered, the design condition for the inflight wind condition is overly conserv- 
ative. The effects of wind biasing should be considered in the definition of the inflight 
wind condition for all future programs. 
Several assessments of cri teria for the inflight wind condition have been completed 
using the wind data measured by the FPS- 16/jimsphere system. King and Ryan (ref. 7) 
made a comparison of maximum space vehicle loads resulting from the idealized syn- 
thetic wind profile to loads resulting from a large sample of jimsphere wind profiles. 
Although the maximum spacecraft loads from the two wind descriptions were of the same 
magnitude, the most severe spacecraft loading w a s  in  response to a high-turbulence 
wind profile, the maximum wind velocity of which was 26 m/sec compared with the 
82.65 m/sec of the design criteria. This result indicates that, for highly flexible vehi- 
cles, the influence of wind turbulence may be of equal or  greater importance than the 
high-wind shear and the high-wind magnitude and should be included in future inflight 
winds response conditions. 
TO combine rationally the effect of winds, propellant slosh, thrust oscillations, 
and trajectory shaping in  new vehicle design, a Monte Carlo analysis of boost is recom- 
mended. As  discussed for the lift-off case, a Monte Carlo solution is one in which input 
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data for many cases  a r e  selected at random f rom pfobability distributions. For boost, 
probability distributions would be defined for  all vehicle parameters,  such as thrust 
oscillations, and the vehicle would be flown, by flight-loads simulation, through a large 
number of measured FPS- 16/jimsphere wind profiles. Using results from these boost 
simulations, a statistical analysis could be made of vehicle structural  loads; this analy- 
sis would be the basis of design loads fo r  the space vehicle. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several conclusions can be made concerning the wind load design conditions of the 
Apollo Program. The prelaunch design conditions did not account for the following ef- 
fects that could be cri t ical  to vehicle loading: exposure periods, turbulence, crawler 
operation, vehicle propellant loadings , on-pad vehicle configurations, auxiliary damp- 
ing, and wind direction. The ground wind-tunnel tests were conducted too late in  the 
program to support the original design of the spacecraft. The Apollo design cr i ter ia  
and analyses for  lift-off were not realistic because they did not consider accurately the 
effects of unsymmetrical thrust buildup, on-pad purging, wind direction and exposure 
periods, realistic description of vortex shedding, realistic representation of thrust 
misalinement, and three-dimensional structural  dynamics. A Monte Carlo analysis 
showed that the root-sum-square method of combining loads for lift-off was overly con- 
servative and created design loads for which the probability of occurrence is unknown. 
The evolution from wind measurement to load measurement as a primary ground- 
wind monitoring system improved the Apollo operational capability by incorporating 
measured vehicle dynamics rather than assuming the existence of conservative levels. 
The inclusion of a biased pitch program in  the space vehicle operations was significantly 
different f rom the design condition and resulted in an overly conservative inflight wind- 
response design condition. By analysis, inflight winds of high turbulence and low mag- 
nitude have been shown to cause loads as severe as the loads resulting from the design 
synthetic wind profile; therefore, the original wind cr i ter ia  were not adequate to ac- 
count for the effects of turbulence. 
Emphasis should be placed on realistic cri teria and analysis of the design wind 
loads; therefore, six recommendations are made. 
1. New programs should include exposure periods, turbulence, propellant load 
and pressurization variations, on-pad maintenance configurations , crawler operations, 
and loads-alleviation methods in  the design prelaunch condition. These were not con- 
sidered i n  the Apollo design. 
2. Wind-tunnel ground-wind testing should be initiated early in  the program to 
allow test resul ts  to influence vehicle design. 
3. The future design phase for  lift-off should include development of a statistical 
load analysis to provide realistic design conditions and greater operational capability. 
4. Provisions for  a wind-monitoring procedure that provides the maximum op- 
erational capability consistent with a safe launch should be included as early as possible 
in  the design of new vehicles. 
5. In future programs, the space vehicle loads relief for all conditions should 
be included in the design as well as in  the operational portion of the vehicle life. 
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6. A Monte Carlo analysis is recommended to define a more rational inflight wind 
design condition. In such an analysis, the new vehicle could be flown, by flight-loads 
simulation, through a large number of measured FPS- 16/jimsphere wind profiles, and 
a statistical analysis could be made using the results of these simulations. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, March 27, 1973 
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